Why is there so much concern over Iran’s nuclear programme?
Natanz’s centrifuges and Fordow’s hardened underground facility are central to Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts. With uranium levels now enriched up to 60%—dangerously close to weapons-grade—and IAEA inspectors unable to access the sites post-strike, Iran’s stockpile is now effectively unmonitored
Conflict between Israel and Iran is intensifying, after Israeli airstrikes on key nuclear sites and targeted assassinations last week were followed by counter-strikes by Iran on Israel.
These attacks have come at a moment of growing concern over Iran’s nuclear program, and have prompted larger questions over what this means for the global non-proliferation regime.
The short answer: it’s not good.
Where was uranium being enriched in Iran?
There are two main enrichment sites: one at Natanz and one at Fordow. There’s also a facility at Isfahan, which, among other things, is focused on producing important materials for the enrichment process.
Natanz has a hall of centrifuges, which are cylindrical devices that spin incredibly quickly to enrich uranium for creating either the fuel for a nuclear power program or the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon.
Much the same is happening at Fordow, as far as we know. It is a smaller facility than Natanz but much of it is buried deep under a mountain.
To make it weapons grade, uranium ought to be close to 90% purity. It is possible to create a bomb with uranium enriched to a lower level, but it is a much less efficient method. So around 90% is the target.
The Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iran signed in 2015 (in exchange for the US lifting sanctions) limited Iran’s enrichment capacities and its stockpile of enriched uranium. But Trump ripped up that deal in 2018.
Iran remained in compliance for a while, even while the US resumed its economic sanctions, but in recent years, has started to enrich to higher levels – up to about 60%. We know Iran still hasn’t got weapons-grade enriched uranium, but it’s a lot closer than it was to being able to build a bomb.
And worse, much of their stockpile of enriched uranium will now be effectively unaccounted for because of the strikes by Israel. There are no inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) happening there now and probably won’t be for some time.
Iran could also say some of its stockpile was destroyed in the strikes – and we’ve got no way of knowing if that’s true or not.
Both Natanz and Fordow have extensive, hardened, underground facilities. The above-ground facility at Natanz, at least, appears to have been badly damaged, based on satellite photos.
Rafael Grossi, the head of the IAEA, said the centrifuges at Natanz were likely to have been “severely damaged if not destroyed altogether”. This was likely caused by power cuts, despite the fact the underground facility was not directly hit.
Grossi said there was no visible damage to the underground facilities at Fordow, which is hidden some 80–90 metres beneath a mountain.
Unlike the United States, Israel doesn’t have the very deep penetrating ordinance that can totally destroy such deeply buried structures.
So a key question is: has Israel done enough damage to the centrifuges inside? Or have Iran’s efforts at fortifying these facilities been successful? We may not know for some time.
Was Iran trying to hide its activities?
In the past, Iran had a clandestine nuclear weapons program laying out the foundation of how it would build a bomb.
We know that because, as part of the diplomatic process associated with the previous nuclear deal that Trump killed off, the IAEA had issued an assessment confirming that Iran previously had this plan in breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Iran hadn’t actually built weapons or done a test, but it had a plan. And that plan, Project AMAD, was shelved in 2003. We also know that thanks to Israel. In 2018, Israeli special forces undertook a raid in downtown Tehran and stole secret documents revealing this.
When the Obama administration managed to negotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015, part of the deal was Iran had to accept greater oversight of its nuclear facilities. It had to accept restrictions, limit the number of centrifuges and couldn’t maintain large stockpiles of enriched uranium. This was in exchange for the US lifting sanctions.
These restrictions didn’t make it impossible for Iran to build a weapon. But it made it extremely difficult, particularly without being detected.
What did the IAEA announce last week?
Last week, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution saying that Iran was in breach of its obligations under the NPT. This related to Iran being unable to answer questions from inspectors about nuclear activities being undertaken at undeclared sites.
