Editorial: Stampede deaths—a familiar saga of apathy

The Kolkata Durga Puja tragedy highlights India's persistent failure to enforce crowd safety protocols despite decades of deadly stampedes and repeated warnings

Stampedes at religious gatherings in India are not random acts of fate. They are the result of repeated failures of crowd management strategies. The death of 19 devotees at a Durga puja pandal in Kolkata came as yet another grim reminder of the serious gaps in our crowd management system, safety protocols, and emergency preparedness. The tragedy could have been prevented if the authorities had adhered to safety standards, especially when considering the anticipated increase in the number of devotees. The disaster took place at the Chorbagan Sarbojanin Durga Puja pandal in north Kolkata when the rain prompted people waiting outside to surge towards the pandal, while an announcement over the public-address system appears to have added to the commotion. The sequence fits into a familiar template—a combination of excessive density, constrained movement, poor anticipation, inadequate infrastructure and a failure to intervene before the crowd becomes unstable. The disturbing part is that India has known this for decades. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has detailed guidelines for mass gatherings, while the Home Ministry has repeatedly advised States to prepare crowd-management SOPs and checklists. Yet the same failures recur. The pattern of stampede incidents is disturbingly familiar. So are the responses that follow. Compensation is announced, a probe is ordered, and a few officials are suspended amid a political blame game. And no lessons are learnt from past mistakes. It’s business as usual till the next tragedy strikes. This has been the story of all recent stampede cases.

 

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Time and again, India’s administrators have failed to learn from past tragedies — from religious stampedes to election rallies. More than a decade ago, the NDMA released a guide on managing crowds at big events and mass gathering venues. The document emphasised capacity planning, crowd control, risk assessment, and real-time surveillance to prevent any mishaps. Inadequate infrastructure, disregard for scientific protocols, absence of accountability and a reactive approach to disasters continue to be significant obstacles. The Kolkata incident is the latest in a series of such stampede deaths. In 2005, over 265 people died in a stampede at Mandhardevi temple in Maharashtra; 145 devotees in Himachal Pradesh’s Naina Devi temple in 2008; over 250 worshippers in Rajasthan’s Chamunda Devi temple in 2008; over 115 in Madhya Pradesh’s Ratangarh temple in 2013 and at least 30 devotees at Prayag Kumbh Mela in January 2025, the sixth stampede during the Kumbh Mela in 70 years. Every stampede is a stark reminder that it is not miracles but proper planning and crowd management protocols that will save us. Repeated temple stampedes should be viewed not as unavoidable accidents or acts of fate, but primarily as failures of risk assessment. The lesson from the Kolkata incident, like many such tragedies in the past, is that the country needs a more dynamic and adaptive approach to crowd management.