Opinion: Has the new Cold War reached a tipping point?
With Trump 2.0 mostly embroiled in the Russia-Ukraine and the volatile wars in West Asia, watchers of Indo-Pacific affairs are questioning Washington’s priorities in the region
By Monish Tourangbam
As high level military leaders and defence honchos from the Indo-Pacific region landed in Singapore for the 22nd edition of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the US-China great power competition hogged the limelight, with all eyes and ears on US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth’s speech. This was his second trip to the Indo-Pacific region as the Trump administration’s top defence emissary following his earlier trip that included stopovers in the Philippines and Japan.
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With Trump 2.0 mostly embroiled in the Russia-Ukraine and the volatile West Asian wars, watchers of Indo-Pacific affairs have, of late, questioned Washington’s priorities in the region. In the Indo-Pacific region, Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariff pronouncements and the trade war with China have largely dominated prime time news.
De-risking Ties with US
Therefore, despite Trump’s foreign policy and national security team showing up in the Indo-Pacific, the lack of presidential focus is being felt and the Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN) member countries, as the recently concluded 46th summit showed, are making their moves to de-risk their ties with the United States.
Can Hegseth’s reassuring tone to allies and partners in the region make up for President Trump’s conspicuous absence from the region? Is the Indo-Pacific region witnessing a tipping point in the new Cold War, as Hegseth drew redlines on the Taiwan case, or is this a case of “much fire and fury, amounting to nothing” as Washington and Beijing take a pause in their trade war? Well, as Bob Dylan once sang, “the answer is blowing in the wind.”
Tough Love, But Love Nonetheless
“Re-establishing deterrence” has emerged as the catchphrase of the second Trump administration as far as its strategy in the Indo-Pacific is concerned, replacing the Biden era “Integrated Deterrence”. How it moves the needle ahead in US force posture and power projection for the region, will perhaps become clearer as Trump 2.0 comes out with its National Security and National Defence strategies.
As of now, Hegseth made one thing clear: that America’s Asian allies are, like their European counterparts vis-à-vis the Russian threat, expected to pick up the slack and share more burden in countering China’s coercive activities. Quite contrary to Vice President JD Vance who berated European allies at the Munich Security Conference earlier this year, Hegseth used European allies as a model for Asian counterparts to follow, in terms of showing greater intent to increase defence spending and take charge of regional defence and security.
‘Re-establishing deterrence’ has emerged as the catchphrase of the second Trump administration as far as its strategy in the Indo-Pacific is concerned, replacing the Biden era ‘Integrated Deterrence’
Contending that “an alliance cannot be ironclad if in reality or perception it is seen as one-sided,” he said, “…we are engaging with, enabling, and empowering our allies. Sometimes with tough love, but love nonetheless.”
Even as Hegseth highlighted how with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies putting more skin into the game, Washington could focus more on the priority theatre of Indo-Pacific, he also prodded regional allies to do more. “So it doesn’t make sense for countries in Europe to do that while key allies in Asia spend less on defence in the face of an even more formidable threat, not to mention North Korea,” he said.
Re-establishing Deterrence the Trump Way
More than a decade ago, the Obama administration had called for an Asian pivot or what came to be called the rebalancing strategy to focus US strategy to counteracting China’s strategic rise, and end the costly wars abroad. Well, it took another decade to strike a Faustian bargain with the Taliban, and even in 2025, Washington continues to harps on how the “open-ended wars, regime change, and nation building” were distractions from its strategic goals.
So, what is different in Trump 2.0? Perhaps, Washington is more vocal about “shared interests” driving alliances and partnerships, and not esoteric “shared values”. As Hegseth said, “We are not here to pressure other countries to embrace or adopt policies or ideologies… We’re not here to impose our will on you. We’re all sovereign nations…we want to work with you where our shared interests align for peace and prosperity.” But, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and time will reveal how the “shared interests” are operationalised in the Indo-Pacific region, and on whose terms.
In the words of its Defence Secretary, the US aims to “re-establish deterrence” in the Indo-Pacific region by improving “forward posture”, by “helping allies and partners strengthen their defence capabilities” and by “rebuilding defence industrial bases”.
For a number of stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region, who consider themselves either allies or strategic partners of the United States, how these means of “re-establishing deterrence” pan out will be extremely crucial, as they go about beefing up their own deterrent capabilities against coercion and transgression. For instance, the case of India-US partnership on co-developing and co-producing defence equipment, as Hegseth mentioned in his speech, will be crucial.
The Answer is Blowing in the Wind!
Hegseth’s speech was guaranteed to elicit strong responses from the Chinese government, particularly on the question of Taiwan. “It’s public that Xi has ordered his military to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027,” he said. “Again, to be clear: any attempt by Communist China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world,” Hegseth added.
Besides doctrinal statements, the thresholds and redlines of great power conflicts and hegemonic wars are never clear. However, the case of Taiwan, in terms of security obligations and geopolitical ambitions, comes too close to being that combustible material that can ignite a fire between the US and China.
Beijing was quick to respond. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson remarked, “The US should never imagine it could use the Taiwan question as leverage against China. The US must never play with fire on this question.” The US Defence Secretary, in the same breadth, warned its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, against hedging their bets between economic cooperation with China and defence cooperation with the US, saying, “Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our defence decision space during times of tension.”
Well, it is worthwhile here to note that French President, Emmanuel Macron, speaking in the same platform in Singapore, said, “…I do believe that the main risk today is a risk of division of the world and a division between the two superpowers. And the instruction given to all the others: you have to choose your side.”
(The author is a Senior Research Consultant at Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi)
