Opinion: US national strategy shift opens new doors and new demands for India

New Delhi’s ability to seize this geopolitical window will depend less on foreign goodwill and more on its own domestic capacity

By Varun Mohan, Dr Anudeep Gujjeti, Dr Zheer Ahmed

The US National Security Strategy (NSS), released by the Trump administration on December 4, marks a decisive shift from previous approaches. It describes past decades as marked by “misguided bets on globalism and so-called free trade” that weakened America’s industrial core and allowed allies to “offload the cost of their defence onto the American people.”

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The new strategy rejects what it calls efforts at “permanent American domination of the entire world” and instead places domestic revival through manufacturing, technology control, tariffs, energy security, and border protection at the centre of national power. American foreign engagement is going to be selective, interest-first and anchored in “peace through strength”. The message to the world is clear: the US will lead differently, with economic muscle and hard power at the centre.

Two Presidents, Two Worldviews

The Biden-Harris National Security Strategy of 2022 imagined the US as a system-shaping power working with allies to uphold “a free, open, prosperous and secure international order”, anchored in democratic values, climate cooperation and collective responses to “shared global challenges”. It leaned on multilateralism by revitalising partnerships like NATO and Quad and on the idea that America could “outcompete rivals” through technology, innovation and rule-based engagement rather than isolation. The 2025 NSS breaks sharply from that approach.

Democracy promotion gives way to sovereignty and selective engagement abroad, with China described as having “got rich and powerful, and used its wealth… to its considerable advantage”, and the Indo-Pacific labelled “the key economic and geopolitical battleground of the coming decades”.

India appears in both documents, but the role expected of it has shifted, from a democratic partner in a values-led framework, to a security-industrial collaborator expected to bolster supply chains, defence production and regional balance.

Strategic Opening

The NSS outlines Washington’s commitment to preventing dominance by any single power in the Indo-Pacific and recognises India’s value in the wider regional architecture, including the Quad. It highlights cooperation in defence, technology, and commercial exchange as the foundation of future engagement. This aligns with India’s own interest in maintaining open sea lanes, deterring coercive behaviour, and diversifying critical supply chains away from China.

If leveraged intelligently, this moment could deepen India’s access to high-value technology like AI, quantum computing, satellite systems, semiconductors, and undersea capabilities, fields where capacity remains uneven at home. Washington’s plan to reshore and friend-shore manufacturing offers space for India to become a key alternative production hub, provided domestic reforms remain steady. India also stands to gain from the shift in US priorities in West Asia.

With Washington viewing the Middle East increasingly as a zone of investment rather than conflict, the environment becomes more favourable for energy security, digital partnerships and infrastructure flows. Given India’s large diaspora presence and energy dependence, stability in the Gulf directly supports national interests.

Expectations, Conditions

The opportunity, however, comes with conditions. This NSS is transactional and outcome-driven. It calls for trade reciprocity, alignment on export controls and a fairer distribution of security burdens among partners. India will be expected not only to cooperate but to deliver. New Delhi must, therefore, navigate three realities. First, economic ties could face friction. America’s prioritisation of domestic reindustrialisation and the emphasis on tariffs aimed at reducing deficits signal harder trade negotiations. India needs to protect policy space for the domestic industry while also demonstrating reliability as a long-term manufacturing partner.

Second, the US move to reclaim energy dominance and its rejection of “Net Zero ideological frameworks” may challenge India’s climate diplomacy and its global South leadership position. India must find a balance between climate responsibility, development needs, and the emerging energy politics of great powers.

If leveraged intelligently, this moment could deepen India’s access to high-value technology like AI, quantum computing, satellite systems, and semiconductors

Third, the NSS references negotiated peace between India and Pakistan, but South Asian stability is not guaranteed by optimism. Cross-border terrorism, Pakistani political volatility, and Chinese influence in the neighbourhood underscore the need for India to retain strategic autonomy. Washington’s expectation that partners shoulder greater regional responsibility means India must prepare to manage crises with reduced external assistance.

Challenge at Home

India’s ability to benefit from this geopolitical window depends less on foreign goodwill and more on domestic capacity. It must accelerate investment in defence manufacturing, semiconductor ecosystems, rare earth security, and advanced research. Regulatory unpredictability, infrastructure delays, skilling gaps and uneven state-level industrial competitiveness remain barriers.

A technology partnership without foundational R&D strength risks keeping India dependent rather than co-developing. Similarly, strategic alignment without economic heft limits bargaining power. The lesson is clear: foreign policy opportunities convert into national gains only when industrial capacity, supply chain resilience and innovation ecosystems are strong.

Not a Binary Choice

The emerging order is neither bipolar nor fully multipolar; it is competitive, transactional and technology-centric. India need not choose sides, but it must choose priorities. It must cooperate with the US where interests align, hedge where needed, and negotiate firmly where autonomy must be preserved. The aim should be to position India not as a counterweight to China alone, but as an independent pole shaping Asia’s stability and global rules.

Additionally, the NSS conveys an ambivalent message in the Indo-Pacific, one of India’s most consequential foreign policy theatres. The 2025 NSS casts the Indo-Pacific as “the key economic and geopolitical battleground of the coming decades” and promises a military able to deny aggression in the First Island Chain. It simultaneously announces that “the days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over” and that allies “must assume primary responsibility for their regions and contribute far more to our collective defence.”

For regional powers like Japan, heavily reliant on the US security umbrella, this creates uncertainty. It remains unclear whether Washington’s new template signals sustained presence or conditional support that may thin out as risks grow. Planned shifts in US deployments create a structural ambivalence: rhetorical emphasis on the Indo-Pacific alongside a material logic of burden-shifting and selective engagement. India must remain alert to this strategic tension.

At the same time, the NSS opens new doors. India can walk through confidently if it treats this moment not as a shield but as a springboard for investing in capacity, protecting sovereignty in negotiation, and expanding its leadership role in Asia and the Global South. The next decade will test not whether India is courted, but whether India is prepared.

(Varun Mohan and Dr Zheer Ahmed are Assistant Professors, School of Geopolitics and Public Policy, REVA University, Bengaluru. Dr Anudeep Gujjeti is Assistant Professor, Symbiosis Law School, Pune, & Young Leader, Pacific Forum, USA)