Editorial: Lessons from Kargil

The war serves as a reminder of the importance of robust military preparedness and intelligence gathering

As India remembers the sacrifices of its soldiers in the Kargil War, which ended on this day 25 years ago, there are several lessons to be learnt from one of the most challenging conflicts the nation ever faced. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC), headed by late K Subrahmanyam, had flagged the inadequacies in the intelligence setup. But, what is alarming is that there has been no major reform in the intelligence domain since then. The same set of intelligence inadequacies have led to avoidable security setbacks including in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 when China carried out surprise attacks on Indian troops. The Kargil War, fought in the treacherous, high-altitude terrain, serves as a reminder of the importance of robust military preparedness, effective intelligence gathering, and inter-service cooperation. Commemorated as Vijay Diwas, this day honours India’s victory against Pakistani infiltrators and the immense sacrifices of its soldiers. Despite numerous logistical and environmental difficulties, the Army adapted its strategies to secure a hard-fought victory. It remains a testament to their resilience and strategic prowess. In the summer of 1999, the tranquillity of the Himalayas was shattered by an intrusion as Pakistani troops, disguised as Kashmiri militants, occupied strategic positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil sector. This audacious act triggered a swift and decisive response from India. Over the following weeks, Indian forces faced heavy casualties as they worked to reclaim these strategic positions.

By July 26, 1999, the Indian Army announced the complete withdrawal of Pakistani troops, marking the end of the conflict. The official toll for India included 527 soldiers killed and 1,363 wounded. The conflict could have been prevented if India had known about Pakistan’s plans. The intelligence agencies, RAW and IB, missed it completely while the Army’s own intelligence too failed to detect the large movement of Pakistani soldiers who wanted to capture Kargil and block the highway connecting Srinagar to Leh. This road is important because it leads to Siachen Glacier where many Indian soldiers are stationed. To achieve this, Pakistan sent thousands of soldiers into empty Indian bunkers on Kargil’s peaks. These bunkers were usually left empty during winter and refilled in summer. Pakistan’s plan started in 1998 and by 1999, their soldiers were already in Indian territory. It was not until a shepherd spotted the Pakistani troops in May 1999 that India realised what was happening. This meant the Indian army had no time to prepare for war. Knowing about Pakistan’s plan beforehand would have given India a huge advantage in terms of troop placement, supplies and overall readiness. The region, characterised by steep mountains, posed significant logistical and tactical challenges. The legacy of the Kargil War continues to inspire and shape military strategies, ensuring that the trials of high-altitude combat are met with preparedness and innovation.

---