Editorial: Time for Maoists to turn mainstream
With public support waning and state forces advancing, Maoists must suspend armed struggle and reconnect with the people to address their needs
The recent surrender of senior Maoist leader Mallojula Venugopal, also known as Sonu, along with 60 comrades and the handover of their weapons to the police in Maharashtra, marks another significant milestone in the Indian Revolutionary Movement. Since its inception, the movement has been shaped by intellectuals guided by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (MLM) ideology, who launched various parties under different banners. Among the most prominent were the CPI (ML) People’s War, influential in undivided Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, and West Bengal, and the MCCI (Maoist Communist Centre of India), which found its base in Bihar, Jharkhand, and parts of northern India. Despite operating under different names, these ultra-left parties shared a common core: the principle of Protracted Armed Struggle to achieve a New Democratic Revolution (NDR). In 2004, the MCCI and the People’s War group merged to form the CPI (Maoist), which greatly intensified the revolutionary movement — so much so that former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described it as the gravest internal security threat India faced. The Maoists devoted considerable effort to refining their military strategies and successfully orchestrated major attacks on police and paramilitary forces across various States. The party firmly adhered to MLM principles, built on three foundational pillars: a strong army, an ideologically driven party, and a united front. Secrecy was the guiding tenet for both the army and party organisations.
However, over time, party strategists appeared to focus more on the military aspect — structures and actions — at the expense of strengthening the network and forging mass organisations. Consequently, the Indian revolution became heavily centred on military operations, often neglecting the essential task of building and sustaining the party base. As India underwent significant economic, social, and political transformations, the once-ambitious vision of creating a united front began to seem almost utopian. Against this backdrop, state security forces started to gain ground, employing the same “3S” principle (Surprise, Speed, and Secrecy), originally used by the guerrillas. Over two decades, these tactics enabled security forces to slowly dominate jungle warfare, launching operations that neutralised scores of Maoist rebels in successive encounters. With public support waning and relentless military pressure mounting, a debate emerged among Maoist strategists over whether the strategy of Protracted Armed Struggle remained suitable, or if conditions now called for its suspension. Some leaders, spearheaded by Mallojula Venugopal, advocated for a temporary halt to armed activities, while others remained staunchly opposed. Ultimately, as the debate persisted, Venugopal and his supporters chose to lay down arms and join the mainstream. It’s worth noting that this is not unprecedented; in 1977, after the Emergency, the then CPI-ML also temporarily suspended armed struggle to reconnect with the people and understand their concerns — a move which later led to the formation of the CPI-ML (People’s War). Given the current circumstances, it may indeed be the right time for the Maoists to suspend armed struggle and openly work among the people to address their needs.
