Behind the opposition between the US and China , we are witnessing a rivalry between political and governance models
By Emmanuel Veron
Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China on June 18-19, a first since Mike Pompeo’s in 2018, was aimed at initiating a “diplomatic thaw” with Beijing and “maintaining” communication channels to manage responsibly the relationship between the United States and China. If all the regional and global strategic issues were addressed, this trip did not (unsurprisingly) give rise to a real thaw.
Beijing is now Washington’s strategic priority, and vice versa. Structural tensions are felt in all areas (economic, military, technological and diplomatic). The bilateral relationship has never been so bad since the Cold War.
Interdependence and Hostility
The continued deterioration of the bilateral relationship is indisputable; and yet, the year 2022 marked a record high in Sino-American trade. Nearly $700 billion has been traded this year alone, despite the Covid-19 pandemic and heightened tensions in Asia, especially around Taiwan, and of course the war in Ukraine as a backdrop.
While the Obama administration sought the “right distance” from Beijing and opted more broadly for “strategic restraint”, the Trump administration considerably accelerated the crystallisation of the balance of power in the sectors of trade, technology, military and security.
The Biden administration (who may be the first president not to visit China since relations resumed in the early 1970s) pursues a policy of containment of China, to curb and counter its ever-growing influence.
How, in this context, can we explain the record exchanges recorded in 2022?
Historian Niall Ferguson showed as early as 2008 in his book ‘The Ascent of Money’ how the Chinese (mainly city dwellers) saved money that they lent to Americans in the form of Treasury bonds. These were used to buy products made in China.
Interdependence has only grown over time, including after the 2008 financial crisis on the one hand, and the Covid-19 crisis on the other, despite some readjustments (the famous “decoupling”). Remember that China remains the second largest holder of US debt.
Economic interdependence has become one of the most defining factors of the China-US relationship. It is gradually extending to all areas — industrial and financial, but also strategic. The case of Taiwan demonstrates this well: in the event of a blockade of the country, the consequences on supply chains would have an impact on the whole world.
American Model
Looking closely, the Sino-American relationship is increasingly sophisticated, the fruit of the interdependence we have just mentioned and of an ever-increasing reciprocal knowledge. Structurally, each step of one is a test for the other.
Chinese stratospheric balloon flying over US territory, Blinken’s assertion from Beijing that China would not deliver arms to Russia at war with Ukraine, Chinese listening stations set up in Cuba, EU relations, including in arbitrations on Chinese 5G or geo-economic dissociation vis-à-vis China, Chinese incursions into the maritime and air space of Taiwan, etc. Above all, both Beijing and Washington closely observe each
other’s weaknesses: economy, unemployment, social imbalances.
On the one hand, the American administration, polarised by the war in Ukraine and continuously by “Indo-Pacific affairs” and the complications of multilateralism , must make priority choices; on the other hand, Beijing, despite its economic and social difficulties, is giving more and more importance to emerging and developing countries in its diplomacy.
The contestation of the American presence in Asia-Pacific intensified from the first years of power of Xi Jinping, who arrived at the head of the PRC in 2013. On the American side, during this period, we created or intensified alliances, especially through the Quad and the AUKUS.
Beyond the Indo-Pacific region, it is the American model as such that is the subject of wider contestation. Beijing is determined to discredit the model of liberal democracy and, behind it, American power. For the PRC, it is a question of modifying the post-1945 international environment (international law, norms and standards, cognition in the physiological sense) to “sinify” it.
In short, behind the opposition between the United States and China , we are witnessing a rivalry between political and governance models. The PRC pursues a strategy of intoxication and attrition with regard to the United States. We can distinguish two major axes: weaving a web of asymmetrical relations and dependencies first, then modifying the post-1945 international environment (international law, norms and standards, cognition in the physiological sense) to ‘sinicize’ it and dominate.
Impossible G2…
If in the 2000s, certain observers evoked a future world governance which would be governed by a Sino-American G2, the two indisputable powers ‘co-managing’ the planet, this hypothesis is today undermined by the Chinese desires for domination and coercion.
Blinken’s visit was able to give some very relative progress (especially points of discussion to maintain the relationship between the two greats outside the strict strategic-military framework), on subjects as varied as cooperation in the protection of the environment and climate, Fentanyl trafficking or the fate of three Americans imprisoned in China. But the blockages remain very numerous, and major: Beijing remains inflexible on the question of Taiwan and refuses to re-establish high-level contact between Chinese and American military officials. On this last point, let us recall that General Li Shangfu, placed on the list of American sanctions, was recently appointed Minister of Defence.
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s four-day visit in early July did not reverse the trend. Her arrival, in a context of strong tensions, particularly on semiconductors, was above all an opportunity for her to affirm her wish that the two countries engage in “healthy competition”.
We should also note that Beijing seems to increasingly dissociate public diplomacy from the major role played by large American firms (visits from Bill Gates, Elon Musk, etc) , perceived as important players in international affairs. Geoeconomics is a lever often used by diplomacy. At this point, the Sino-American rivalry is, less than a classic confrontation (politico-military), a standoff where the two parties seek to gain the upper hand through economic development, innovation and contestation of the political model of the other.
While NATO is going to open a liaison office in Japan , the Alliance’s Vilnius summit, echoing the Ukrainian front, shows that it is increasingly integrating the possibility of opening a front in Asia — a prospect that Beijing and Washington dread, but both consider plausible. (theconversation.com)