Opinion: Five years of Myanmar Civil War—How it threatens India’s Act East Policy
Amid Myanmar’s ongoing challenges, India must manage immediate concerns while advancing its long-term strategy to counter China’s influence in Southeast Asia
By Dhanapriya Chungkham
Last month, Myanmar marked the fifth anniversary of its latest civil war, which began in 2021 after the military junta removed the elected government. Domestic politics in Myanmar have been dominated by its military since 1962. In the aftermath of the coup d’etat, the People’s Defence Force (PDF) was formed on May 5th 2021. Another historical challenge to the peace and stability has been the failure of state-building since Myanmar’s independence in 1948. The Bamar-dominated State has also faced resistance from several ethnic minority-led militias, reflecting the country’s complex ethnic composition.
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Three rebel groups — the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) — formed the Three Brotherhood Alliance to oppose the military in a coordinated manner. Furthermore, since the latest coup, the military junta has come under increased pressure as the PDF has coordinated with such ethnic rebel groups. This has further complicated the situation for India, particularly regarding security along its northeastern frontier and its Act East Policy.
Never-Ending Nightmare
The Civil War has been a quagmire of persistent fighting, impacting human security in the region. The state and the junta regime are at their weakest, and according to recent estimates, they control only 21-25 per cent of the territory. They are losing ground both militarily and politically.
The State has historically faced security challenges in the peripheral regions where Bamar’s are not the majority. However, the current situation is unique in that the Burmese state is at its weakest since independence. Losing more than 75 per cent of its territory has also affected the morale of the armed forces.
The declining morale has further weakened the regime’s position. The military is also struggling to maintain control over the Bamar heartland, with major cities like Mandalay under threat from forces like the PDF and allies. Politically, the military elite’s position has been further undermined by the unprecedented unpopularity of the junta regime. The National Unity Government (NUG), formed by ousted civilian lawmakers and anti-coup forces, along with the PDF, are quite popular even among ethnic Bamar. According to a recent poll conducted by the diaspora-led Myanmar Policy Institute (MPI), around 74 per cent of the respondents support anti-government forces like the PDF and NUG.
Myanmar’s prolonged conflict is hitting Northeast security, delaying key connectivity projects, and complicating India’s Act East Policy
At the level of human security, the country has around 3 million internally displaced people. There has been some spillover effect, as some of the refugees have fled to India’s northeastern region. This complicates India’s own internal security in the Northeast, adding to the existing social divisions and ethnic tensions. The porous borders between India and Myanmar have long been inhabited by communities with cross-border ethnic ties. The instability also poses challenges for India’s strategic ambitions in Myanmar and other continental Southeast Asian states, as envisioned in land-based connectivity projects such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand-Trilateral Highway (IMTTH) and Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project.
Connectivity Projects
The Kaladan Project is an ambitious initiative aimed at reducing the Northeastern States’ dependence on ports in mainland India. It combines sea, inland waterway, and road-based projects to connect India’s eastern seaport to Myanmar’s Sittwe Port, and further to Northeast India through Myanmar. Due to the civil war, the construction of the road between Paletwa (Myanmar) and Mizoram remains incomplete.
The IMTTH project, which aims to extend beyond Thailand in the future, is also delayed in Myanmar. The Thai portion of the highway has been completed. But due to the ongoing conflict, around 30 per cent of the project is unfinished. In Myanmar, the Kalewa-Yagyi portion of the highway is critically stalled.
In response to these external and internal security challenges, India has adopted a realistic, multi-pronged approach, keeping its strategic options open. India maintains ties with both the regime and ethnic/anti-regime forces to manage short-term challenges. These short-term adjustments are part of its long-term strategic ambitions in Southeast Asia.
Act East Policy
The fragile condition of the junta regime after five years of civil war poses significant challenges to India’s strategic ambitions in Southeast Asia. In 2014, amid China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific, India transitioned from its Look East Policy towards the Act East Policy, signalling a shift in approach towards the region.
Under the Look East Policy, India’s primary focus was economic, seeking access to the Southeast Asian market. The Act East Policy, on the other hand, is more strategic in nature. This is reflected in India’s enhanced engagement with the region beyond economic interests. First, since 2014, India has strengthened bilateral ties with most Southeast Asian countries by signing new strategic partnerships or elevating existing ones to comprehensive strategic partnerships.
Second, India has actively promoted key connectivity projects such as IMTTH and Kaladan. Crucially, both projects require a stable Myanmar to succeed.
Given the ongoing challenges in Myanmar, India must continue addressing short-term issues while keeping in mind its long-term strategy of balancing Chinese dominance in Southeast Asia. This calls for careful planning and strategic clarity. Mainstreaming India’s Northeast into its broader strategic vision would be a major step, along with managing the evolving security situation in Myanmar. India’s Northeast serves as the gateway to Southeast Asia, and how India manages this gateway will define its strategic trajectory in the 21st century.
(The author is a research scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University [JNU], New Delhi)
