Rewind: Black Storm rising — the new wave of Baloch insurgency
From militant operation Herof 2.0 to women-led civil resistance, Balochistan is at the epicentre of a deepening internal crisis even as Pakistan fights its own battle
By Ruchi Sharma
With the Pakistani establishment already mired in multiple challenges, including a precarious economy reliant on IMF bailouts and external loans, the declining popularity of the military, and the violent unrest in Sindh over the Indus canals project, the exponential rise in militant attacks in Balochistan, as well as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has laid down a political minefield for the hybrid regime.
Notably, the May 11 statement of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) spokesperson — the foremost secessionist group in the Balochistan province — outlined that the objective of the recent operations was “not simply to destroy the enemy but to test military coordination, ground control, and defensive positions, to strengthen readiness for future organized warfare.” The BLA claimed to have carried out 71 coordinated attacks spanning 51 sites across Balochistan province on May 11.
Although the insurgency in Balochistan dates as far back as 1948 when it was incorporated into the Pakistani body-politic (an event that many Balochs view as coercive), the current cycle has continued for around two decades
Late last August, the BLA orchestrated its operation named ‘Herof’, which means ‘black storm’ in Balochi and Brahui, wherein its Majeed Brigade suicide fighters and elite units — Fatah Squad and Special Operation Tactical Squad (STOS) —launched highly methodical and sophisticated attacks on Pakistani security forces and death squads (state-backed militias).
The group claimed to have killed at least 130 Pakistani soldiers through the operation. The recent series of attacks is being touted by the insurgents as preparatory groundwork for Operation ‘Herof’ 2.0, which promises to be more lethal, sustained, and strategically impactful.
In light of the recent escalation in BLA offensives against the state — particularly since the March hijacking of the Quetta-Peshawar Jaffar Express — it is evident that the armed insurgency in Balochistan has grown in both capability and determination. Moreover, the increasing targeting of Chinese workers and projects, as well as Punjabi migrants in the province, has created serious challenges for the regime, which now faces the risk of jeopardising its most strategic partnership on the one hand and contending with ethnic unrest on the other.
A People Besieged
Although the insurgency in Balochistan dates as far back as 1948 when it was incorporated into the Pakistani body-politic (an event that many Balochs view as coercive), the current cycle has continued for around two decades. The Baloch people have, for a long time, complained of political marginalisation, extreme socio-economic backwardness, and state exploitation of resources.
The province is abundant in reserves of coal, natural gas, gold, and copper, yet it is the most impoverished in the country, with a multi-dimensional poverty index of 71.2 per cent. These grievances, coupled with the state’s brutal and excessive response to separatist activities, subjecting the whole population to collective punishment, have caused acute mistrust between the Baloch people and the state that demonstrates an absolute lack of accountability. However, rather than politically engaging with the people and trying to win them over, the regime has solely relied on a military approach, normalising abuses such as enforced disappearances, fake encounters, custodial torture, and violent crackdowns on peaceful protests, with complete impunity.
The presence of Chinese infrastructural projects in the province, especially the Gwadar Port, has only intensified perceptions of centralised exploitation of Baloch resources at the expense of the local population. This is one of the main reasons why the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has faced strong opposition in the province, along with concerns over the ecological impact of the projects and the activities of Chinese fishing trawlers.
In the past few years, particularly since late 2023, a peaceful civil resistance movement has emerged that demands state accountability for the excesses enacted upon the Baloch people in the name of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. Most prominently, the Baloch Yakjehti (Solidarity) Committee has come into the limelight, particularly its leader Dr Mahrang Baloch who led the historic long-march (dubbed as March against Baloch Genocide) from Turbat to Quetta (provincial capital) to Islamabad, in December 2023-January 2024.
This movement has also attracted global attention due to the remarkable leadership and participation of women within it. Nevertheless, instead of utilising this opening to build confidence with the people, the regime again responded with extreme measures and incarcerated the movement leaders, including Baloch who remains in prison. These coercive tactics further push the people to support the militancy, indefinitely fuelling the cycle of violence and repression.
Sophisticated Insurgency
The insurgency, for its part, has undergone operational and rhetorical transformations over the years to adapt to the changing times and scale up its offensive against the state. The BLA, which began under the leadership of tribal leaders like Balach Marri, is now led by the educated middle class, including women. Leaders like Aslam Baloch (killed in 2018 and whose son, Rehan Baloch, was responsible for the suicide bombing targeting Chinese engineers in Dalbandin in the same year), Bashir Zaib Baloch, Hammal Rehan, Rehman Gul Baloch, among others, have overseen a strategic shift in the organisational approach.
The presence of Chinese infrastructural projects in the province, especially the Gwadar port, has only intensified perceptions of centralised exploitation of Baloch resources at the expense of the people
The BLA, which traditionally relied on hit-and-run operations in the mountains targeting gas pipelines, mobile towers, railway tracks, and other such sites, now undertakes more organised and sophisticated attacks on the state security forces, including in urban centres. The March 11 train hijacking by the BLA to demand the return of Baloch political prisoners and forcefully disappeared persons embroiled the military for over 24 hours, revealing the insurgents’ capability to keep up engagement with state forces for a sustained period.
Moreover, the increasing use of suicide attackers has significantly augmented both the lethality and complexity of the BLA’s operations, as well as the challenges faced by the military. Interestingly, some of these suicide attacks have also been carried out by women. There have been a few suicide bombing cases by women fighters of the BLA, beginning with Shari Baloch, who killed three Chinese teachers at the University of Karachi’s Confucius Institute in 2022, and Banuk Mahikan Baloch, who targeted a Frontier Corps patrol vehicle in Kalat in March of this year.
An important factor that has bolstered the Baloch insurgency in recent years has been the coming together of the erstwhile fragmented militant groups under the banner of the Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS). Formed in 2018, the coalition comprises the BLA, BLF (Balochistan Liberation Front), and BRA (Baloch Republic Army), as well as SRA (Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army), and even declared a unified military command — Baloch National Army — to organise a coordinated plan of action in the province, earlier this year.
Moreover, the withdrawal of the US forces from neighbouring Afghanistan and the reinstatement of the Taliban proved advantageous for both Baloch insurgents and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (also known as Pakistani Taliban). These groups acquired advanced weapons systems left behind in Afghanistan and incredibly upgraded their arsenal overnight. This was also seen in the case of the aforementioned train hijacking, after which Pakistani officials revealed the serial numbers of three US rifles used by the militants — rifles that had been provided to the Afghan forces during the war. Additionally, the return of the Taliban has made it easier for Baloch insurgents to access sanctuaries in Afghanistan, besides those in the Sistan-Baluchistan province in neighbouring Iran.
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been vigorously opposed in the province, besides other reasons, such as the ecological impact of the projects and the activities of Chinese fishing trawlers
At the same time, there has been a clear advancement in the BLA’s propaganda capabilities and use of social media. In response to increasing urbanisation and digital expansion, the organisation is leveraging social media to post its activities and promote narrative, trying to tap more into the urban, educated youth constituency. Interestingly, the May 11 statement of the BLA reflects an effort to elevate its strategic posturing from a localised guerrilla movement to a crucial stakeholder in South Asian geopolitics, one that can help undermine the “terrorist state” of Pakistan.
The group asserted itself as an independent, indigenous, national liberation movement, rejecting Pakistan’s accusations of it being abetted by foreign interests, and sought support from India and other international actors. Although it is unlikely for India to accede to this appeal given multiple strategic considerations, it still becomes a useful geopolitical tool to put pressure on its arch-rival.
Therefore, the messaging accompanying Operation ‘Herof 2.0’ or the ‘black storm’ is clearly beyond militaristic. It involves psychological projection of endurance and long-term strategic vision, aiming to destabilise state morale and inviting broader support.
Internal Unrest, External Fallout
In addition to posing a formidable internal security threat with grave ramifications for national stability, the Baloch insurgency also presents a significant foreign policy challenge for Pakistan. Apart from having a direct bearing on Pakistan’s relations with China, it also has implications for the former’s ties with all its other neighbouring states.
Pakistan also alleges that the Taliban allows its territory to be used by the BLA, an accusation that the latter denies. This is again a bone of contention between the two one-time close allies. Similarly, Pakistan also accuses India of with covertly aiding the Baloch insurgency (a claim India categorically dismisses), further deepening the mistrust between the two neighbours.
The province is abundant in reserves of coal, natural gas, gold, and copper, yet it is the most impoverished in the country, with multi-dimensional poverty index at 71.2%
Finally, since the Baloch nationalist imagination also includes the Sistan-Baluchistan region of Iran, the issue naturally causes tensions between Iran and Pakistan. Baloch groups from either country often cross into the other for safe havens, forcing both regimes to engage into strained dialogue. At times, this strain takes a more aggressive proportion, such as the tit-for-tat strikes that took place in January last year over Baloch separatist hideouts in both countries.
Militarised Approach
The intensification of the armed Baloch insurgency, reflected in its operational capabilities, ambitions, rhetorical evolution, and strategic posturing, reveals the abject failure of the state’s approach towards the Baloch issue.
As per The Balochistan Post, the year 2024 registered 938 attacks by Baloch militant groups, causing over 1,000 deaths — an increase of 53 per cent in attacks and 80 per cent in fatalities, in comparison to the previous year. This is also one of the chief factors behind the waning legitimacy of the Pakistani military.
Moreover, the insurgents’ vehement opposition to, and increasing attacks on, the Chinese presence in the province threaten a relationship that is critical to Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests. Besides, the actions of the BLA, particularly during the time of the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan, display its eagerness to strike harder when Pakistan is entangled in a sensitive situation.
Given these mounting pressures, it is evident that for Pakistan, the costs of persisting with a purely militarised response in Balochistan are becoming increasingly untenable. Therefore, it must urgently recalibrate its policy and lead with comprehensive political engagement. The road to resolving this decades-old, blood-spattered quandary is long, but it is one Pakistan must begin to secure its internal stability and international standing.
(The author is a PhD scholar at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Associate Fellow, International Centre for Peace Studies, with focus on geopolitical developments in South Asia, particularly Pakistan)
