Xi Jinping is widely tipped to be given an extended term as CCP’s General Secretary. For the rest of the world, this means Xi will stay on as Chinese President for another five years, even possibly longer.
By Ajay Gokul
Next week, some 2,300-odd delegates will descend on Beijing to partake in the 20th Party Congress. Taking place once every five years, it is a well-choreographed political gathering of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Important decisions on policy direction and political leadership set the course for the next five years. But unlike the previous few editions, this year’s gathering is highly consequential. Xi Jinping is widely tipped to be given an extended term as CCP’s General Secretary. For the rest of the world, this means Xi will stay on as Chinese President for another five years, even possibly longer.
Hierarchical Structure
Before looking back on the last decade of Xi’s leadership and the projected trajectory ahead, the political significance of next week’s events would be better appreciated with a brief understanding of the Chinese political and governance structure. Unlike India or other Western democracies, China is a one party-state. There are three roles Xi Jinping holds concurrently, the most significant of that is being the General Secretary of the CCP. The next in order of importance is his position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, putting him at the helm of the world’s largest military. Being the President is his most junior and perhaps a rather ceremonial title. At first glance, it can be complex to differentiate between Party and State, especially with multiple parallel governance structures. But one thumb rule holds true in every case; the Party always takes precedence over the State. For the uninitiated, it may come as a surprise that China’s military, the two-million-strong People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as it is called, pledges its allegiance to the Party, not the State. The PLA is, in fact, considered the armed wing of the CCP.
The intense speculation over who gets those coveted PSC seats will be put to rest as the new leadership team will make its debut. But one familiar face is certain to be present, Xi
The CCP follows a pyramidal hierarchical structure. At the bottom are the nearly 92 million grassroots party members. From them, some 2,300 delegates are elected to be sent to the National Congress of the CCP, which is the formal title of next week’s gathering. From within themselves, these delegates select about 380 to become members of the Central Committee. Those members, in turn, select the Politburo, which roughly consists of 25 members. A handful of them are chosen to become part of China’s most powerful decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC).
At the end of next week’s Congress, 7 men (yes, sadly, it has always been men) clad in dark suits will walk the red carpet in ranking order at the Great Hall of the People to an awaiting press corp. The intense speculation over who gets those coveted PSC seats will be put to rest as the new leadership team will make its debut. But one familiar face is certain to be present, Xi. For an unprecedented third time, he will lead those 7 men (and the 1.4 billion Chinese people) as the Party’s top leader.
Whilst, in theory, it seems to be a democratic exercise from the bottom up, the decision-making is often a well-planned theatrical spectacle. Significant decisions are concluded beforehand over months of horse-trading and secretive deliberations in plenums as leaders jockey for positions behind closed doors. The delegates attending the Congress are often party elites and very few represent the grassroots membership. Small and secretive preparatory committees established almost a year ago have managed the selection of these delegates through strict screening processes. The role of party ‘elders’ in deciding who gets the top seats higher up the CCP pyramid has seen a relative decline as Xi has centralised power into his own hands. Even though Xi breaches the unwritten party convention of retirement age and term limit, they are to be conveniently overlooked this time while the same have been strictly enforced at local and regional levels.
Early Spadework
The groundwork for Xi’s extended term was set way back in 2018 at the National People’s Congress (NPC). This is a State organ, not to be confused with the upcoming party Congress. The constitution was amended to remove the two-year term limit it placed on the presidency. Although the NPC is technically the top governing and law-making body of China, it is dominated by the CCP membership and has no official opposition parties. Some analysts even call it a rubber-stamp parliament because of its subservience to the CCP.
Xi’s insistence on absolute loyalty is a clear sign of dissent existing within the party, making him more vulnerable, if anything
When Xi took on the reign a decade ago, his goal was to achieve ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ with ambitions of making China a global power again on the world stage. So far, in terms of the economy, China is now on track to surpass the United States as the world’s largest in the next 10 years. China has the world’s largest Navy and Xi’s flagship Belt and Road initiative has allowed it to build infrastructure and influence all around the world.
Under Xi’s leadership, the PLA has had an organisational overhaul with a rapid modernisation of the military. The meteoric rise of China’s defence expenditure over the last decade can be attributed to its massive economic growth since the turn of this century. In line with Xi’s 2035 ‘socialist modernisation’ plan, which he outlined in the last party Congress, the PLA has put quality over quantity. A 2021 paper by the Observer Research Foundation highlights PLA’s optimisation efforts, trimming down its personnel, redirecting spending and focusing on modernisation. Rapid strides are being made in drone technology, unmanned transportation and radar surveillance alongside massive research spending on artificial intelligence and quantum computing. https://telanganatoday.com/tag/xi-jinping
The PLA Navy has grown leaps and bounds in Xi’s term. It has significantly upgraded its brown water defence capabilities, which act as the first line of defence to protect the coasts and shorelines. This has undoubtedly unsettled its rival, especially the US. A Congressional Research Service report in March this year noted the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort with alarm. However, an assessment of the type of vessels shows that China’s blue water navy still needs further strengthening. Especially its submarine domain, as critical subsystems and even entire platforms are very much dependent on Russian supplies. To this effect, indigenisation of production is a key focus of Xi’s modernisation process.
Technological advancements in aerospace, especially over the last decade, have equipped China with the capabilities of waging non-contact warfare like malware and cyberattacks. In 2020, it became independent of America’s Global Positioning System (GPS) by launching its own Satellite Navigation System. Satellites to increase surveillance and missile capabilities to destroy rival satellites have been developed. Space programmes’ success has had a massive and direct public appeal, spurring patriotic fervour. Like the US-Soviet space rivalry in the Cold War era, a new age of space race is bound to pit the US against China.
Dubbed the ‘cosmos club’, aviation and aerospace experts have increasingly taken prominent political leadership positions. Cheng Li, the Director of the John L Thornton China Center notes that this rising cohort of well-educated military technocrats is not necessarily reflective of China’s preparedness for high-tech warfare, especially when it has not faced a conflict in many decades. It also doesn’t make them better leaders in tackling growing socio-political challenges domestically and an unfavourable diplomatic atmosphere internationally. Military superiority alone cannot determine the prospects of winning a war. Russia’s lacklustre performance in the Ukraine conflict is a case in point. Despite its military might, poor decision-making, weak battlefield performance and high casualties characterise a chaotic Russian showdown.
Economy and the PLA
Nevertheless, Xi understands that the PLA is indispensable to China’s ambitious future and his 2035 goal. It will play a significant role in securing China’s commercial interests and a growing economy will ensure a more robust military. The economy and the PLA — and by extension National Security — have formed a symbiotic relationship. This is where Xi’s biggest challenge lies. The Chinese economy has grown by a meagre 0.4% in Q2 of this year, the worst performance in 30 years. Western think tanks and agencies lowered annual growth predictions while Xi is mustering officials to do all it takes to ensure the 5.5% target is achieved.
The Chinese economy has grown by a meagre 0.4% in Q2 of this year, the worst performance in 30 years and Xi is mustering officials to do all it takes to ensure the 5.5% target is achieved
The summer of 2021 saw Xi announce his signature economic policy of ‘common prosperity’. Tackling economic inequality and redistribution of wealth may well be a favourable short-term policy objective. Still, it will serve no good in the longterm if the economy keeps contracting. A large portion of a small pie won’t keep everyone too happy for long. Since that announcement, Xi has been plagued by the twin crises of the strict zero-Covid policy and a slumping property market.
The former is especially having devastating effects in production hubs like Tianjin and Shenzhen as the industrial manufacturing economy has taken a severe blow. A rebound of this is expected to be painfully slow as demand from the US and the West is on a decline due to high interest rates, energy crisis and soaring inflation. All of this is partially attributed to the conflict initiated by China’s ‘no limits’ partner Russia in Ukraine. With the property market making up almost a third of China’s GDP, the recent Evergrande crisis has spooked the market. Several homeowners have paused mortgage payments and property rates have significantly declined.
Apart from these, the intense competition between local governments ever since the opening up of the economy in 1979 has prioritised rapid, short-term economic growth. It disincentivised long-term objectives like inequality, living standards or environmental concerns. It is now paying the price as extreme weather and climate change are wreaking havoc on the economy, from flooding to severe heat waves that led to blackouts in urban areas. All these economic issues and heavy domestic headwinds will keep Xi’s hands full in his next term.
International Relations
When it comes to foreign policy, Xi’s convictions and worldview closely inform it. Jude Blanchette, the Freeman Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, recently commented on the marginalisation of traditional bureaucratic institutions of foreign policy like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Taiwan Affairs Office. Whilst dissent is stifled at home, the rejuvenation goal with which Xi set out has made China more assertive in international relations, moving away from its years of ‘peaceful rise’. This bears a heavy mark of the CCP’s economic and military synergy under Xi.
There can be no larger-than-life celebrities in China barring Xi, whose increasing centralisation makes him the ‘Chairman of everything’
Relations with Australia and Canada have deteriorated even as ties with Japan and UK have soured. The hasty implementation of draconian security laws in Hong Kong, border conflicts with India, its treatment of the Uyghur minority, especially in Xinjiang, and confrontational behaviour in Taiwan and the South China Sea have all attracted widespread criticism and condemnation. These seem to be the signs of a faltering and ill-thought-out foreign policy.
That brings us to the final feature of Xi’s leadership that has come to define his last decade in power and is bound to have ramifications in the future. His personality cult and consolidation of power. The sage advice of Deng Xiaoping against ‘over concentration of power’ as the root cause of policy mistakes springs to mind. There can be no larger-than-life celebrities in China barring Xi, whose increasing centralisation makes him the ‘Chairman of everything’. Everyone is on the radar— from business tycoons to sports legends to even cinema stars and social media influencers. Anyone with a considerable influence over the psyche of the Chinese people, especially the youth, is a challenge to his strongman image. Xi’s insistence on absolute loyalty along with the purging of any rivals, including two former ministers last month, are clear signs of dissent existing within the party, making him more vulnerable, if anything.
Next week, the stage is set for political drama — promotions, reappointments, reassignments and retirements. With loyalty trumping competence, will those in the high echelons of power be well-equipped to tackle the challenges that await China? Xi must be careful not to fall prey to his own extensive propaganda. As he continues to surround himself with Yes-ministers, he embarks on a dangerous game. A game of high stakes.
(The author is Founder and President of Global Madras, a student-led think tank based in Tamil Nadu)